Before sending a DMCA takedown notice, one must consider whether the objectionable material constitutes fair use

I wrote recently that Universal was resting its case on a "weak reed" in arguing that it need not consider whether the use of its copyrighted materials is fair use before sending a DMCA takedown notice. The case, of course, involves the YouTube video of a baby dancing for 29 seconds to Prince's "Let's Go Crazy." US Judge Jeremy Fogel agrees: he ruled 2 days ago that content holders must consider the fair use premise before sending takedown notices to video sites. In his decision (pdf), Judge Fogel writes:

[I]n order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with “a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,” the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA. Such an
interpretation of the DMCA furthers both the purposes of the DMCA itself and copyright law in general. In enacting the DMCA, Congress noted that the “provisions in the bill balance the need for rapid response to potential infringement with the end-users [sic] legitimate interests in not having material removed without recourse.” Sen. Rep. No. 105-190 at 21 (1998).

Universal Goes Crazy

"Universal Music told a federal judge . . . Friday that takedown notices requiring online video-sharing sites to automatically remove content need not consider whether videos are protected by the 'fair use' doctrine." The case involves Stephanie Lenz's 29 second video of her son dancing to Prince's "Let's Go Crazy," which Universal sought to remove via a DMCA takedown notice at Prince's insistence that he has total control over all uses of his music. Lenz is now seeking damages on the grounds that in sending the takedown notice Universal knowingly misrepresented that Lenz's video was infringing. Since it is difficult to believe anyone involved in the music industry (other than, perhaps, Prince) would believe the video was infringing, I guess Universal has no argument left other than the one they made: fair use is irrelevant when considering the propriety of sending a takedown notice. It seems a weak reed on which to rest its case.

EFF's brief (pdf) in the case, by the way, is excellent.

Scrabble v. Scrabulous

There is, on the one hand, having a legal right to one's intellectual property. On the other, there is the question: does it make business sense to assert that right to shut down an infringer?

Looking to cut down its main competition and most high-profile copycat in the growing market for social gaming, Hasbro has sued the two Indian brothers behind the popular Web game Scrabulous, which has more than half a million regular users on the social network Facebook.

Hasbro, the Rhode Island company that owns the trademark to the 60-year-old board game, Scrabble, on which Scrabulous is closely based, has also asked Facebook to remove the game under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, saying that it infringes the company’s intellectual property. Facebook has not yet responded to or commented on the request.

A copy of the complaint is here (pdf).

As Josh Quitner writes, "[A]s a tech writer and life-long student of what passes for Internet economics, I’m baffled. Is Hasbro just a stupid Potato Head? Or is this a brilliant game of Stratego?" And Mike Masnick observes:

The Scrabulous/Hasbro situation is a perfect example of Matt Mason's thesis that "piracy" is almost never about "theft." It's almost always a market indicator that the market is unhappy with what's being offered. It's the market showing companies what they want.

When is a takedown notice based on a misrepresentation, and when does taking material down constitute a breach of YouTube's duties?

In 2007, YouTube informed Stephanie Lenz of Pennsylvania that it had removed a video she had posted after YouTube had received a takedown notice from Universal Music Publishing Group ("UMPG"). The video, 29 seconds long, showed Lenz's 13 month old son dancing to Prince's Let's Go Crazy. Ms. Lenz sent a counter-notification to YouTube requesting that YouTube re-post the video, but YouTube did not do so until, six weeks later, UMPG dropped its copyright claim.

Now, with the assistance of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lenz is suing UMPG. Her complaint (pdf) seeks (1) a declaration that the use of Let's Go Crazy in the video constitutes fair use, (2) an injunction against any lawsuit or threat against Lenz in connection with her video, and (3) damages under the DMCA because UMPG "knowingly materially misrepresent[ed]" that the video infringed UMPG's copyright in Let's Go Crazy.

Lenz's first cause is based on the provision of the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) providing that anyone who "materially misrepresents" that "material or activity is infringing" is liable to the alleged infringer (in this case, Lenz) for any damage arising from the misrepresentation.

Copyright overclaiming is a problem, and UMPG plainly concluded in the end that it had been wrong in its initial position that Lenz's video infringed the copyright in Let's Go Crazy. But was that error so obvious at the time UMPG sent its takedown notice that it was a "material misrepresentation"? It is a trite at this point to observe that whether a given unauthorized use of copyrighted material is a non-infringing fair use is a difficult, case-by-case question; nevertheless, some cases are less difficult than others

In this case there does not seem to be any reasonable basis for UMPG to have believed Lenz's video infringed the copyright in Let's Go Crazy. Len'z video used only 29 seconds of the song, was for non-profit purposes, and would not serve as a substitute for any primary or derivative use of Prince's song. In short, the decision UMPG made 6 weeks after sending its takedown notice is one it should have reached before sending the notice. Lenz's case may not be as strong as that asserted in OPG v. Diebold, but it is one that should worry UMPG.

Lenz's lawsuit might worry Viacom even more. Viacom sent Google/YouTube over 100,000 takedown notices based merely on the fact the videos targeted by those notices contained "unauthorized" clips of material in which Viacom owns the copyright. By definition, any non-infringing fair use will be "unauthorized." Lenz's use of Let's Go Crazy was unauthorized. It was not infringing. It seems likely that among Viacom's 100,000 plus takedown notices are many that Viacom either knew or should have known were unwarranted. How could Viacom possibly have made over 100,000 legitimate fair use decisions about 100,000 different videos?

In addition, Lenz's lawsuit asserts a second, very creative, cause of action alleging that UMPG's unwarranted takedown notice tortiously interfered with Lenz's contract with YouTube. Roughly speaking, UMPG tortiously interfered with Lenz's contract with YouTube if (1) UMPG knew in sending its takedown notice it would cause YouTube to breach a contract with Lenz and (2) UMPG acted "improperly" in sending the notices. What constitutes "improper" conduct is often difficult to determine; nevertheless, it seems obvious that UMPG's takedown notice was "improper" if Lenz prevails on her first cause of action -- for her to do so, the court must find that the claim of infringement asserted in its takedown notice was a "material misrepresentations" that violated § 512(f). The outer boundaries separating "proper" from "improper" conduct may be vague; "material misrepresentations," however, are obviously well on the "improper" side of those boundaries.

The remaining and more difficult question on this second cause of action is whether YouTube breached its contract with Lenz when it did not restore her video until 6 weeks after she sent her counter-notice. YouTube's Terms of Use provide that in the event YouTube, in response to a takedown notice, removes a video, the person who submitted the video can file a counter-notice asserting her argument that the video does not infringe the rights of the person who sent the original takedown notice. Section 8B of the Terms of Use further provides that when YouTube receives such a counter-notice

YouTube may send a copy of the counter-notice to the original complaining party informing that person that it may replace the removed content or cease disabling it in 10 business days. Unless the copyright owner files an action seeking a court order against the content provider, member or user, the removed content may be replaced, or access to it restored, in 10 to 14 business days or more after receipt of the counter-notice, at YouTube's sole discretion. (emphasis added)

In short, even if UMPG's takedown notice was unwarranted, YouTube's failure to restore the video for six weeks after receipt of Lenz's counter-notice does not seem to be a breach of any express contractual duty owed by YouTube to Lenz -- the contract provides that YouTube has the unilateral right to restore or not restore the contested material. Moreover, the DMCA provides, in 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1) , that "a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the service provider’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing." (emphasis added)

Nevertheless, Lenz could possibly prevail in arguing that the legitimacy of her video was so obvious that YouTube's failure to immediately restore it after she served her counter-notice was a breach of its implied duty to act in "good faith." As § 512(g)(1), quoted above, indicates, YouTube's immunity from liability for disabling Lenz's video requires that in doing so it acted in "good faith." Moreover, though the duty rarely seems to have practical weight, every contract implicitly requites the parties to act in good faith. Finally, YouTube emphasizes that it will consider seriously the merits raised by counter-notices -- its Community Guidelines, which are incorporated by reference into its Terms of Service, provide that "[i]f we remove your video after reviewing it, you can assume that we removed it purposefully, and you should take our warning notification seriously."

If YouTube had indeed taken UMPG and Lenz's respective positions seriously, it is difficult to believe it needed to wait until UMPG backed off from its infringement claim to conclude that Lenz's video was non-infringing. Thus, Lenz's argument on her tortious interference with contract claim would be that YouTube breached its obligations to her to evaluate UMPG's infringement claim "seriously." It is a very interesting and creative claim, and one that truly puts YouTube's policies in these disputes to the test.

Addendum: Sherwin Sly adds some cogent analysis to the dispute between Lenz and UMPG.

Digital locks, fair use, and the Constitution

Canada is considering legislation that would make it illegal to break digital protections on copyrighted material (i.e., so-called "DRM" ("Digital Rights Management") protection"). The Canadian bill apparently is intended to override existing rights, including the right to backup or copy digital materials for personal use or for fair use of materials with DRM protection. Apparently too, "mash ups and satire will be criminalized by the bill if they 'distort or mutilate a copyright performance.'" A group of Canadian musicians have severely criticized the bill, stating that "[t]he question is, who gains from this bill? It’s not musicians. Musicians don’t need lawsuits, we don’t need DRM protection. These aren’t the things that help us or our careers. What we do need is a government that is willing to sit down with all the stakeholders and craft a balanced copyright policy for Canada that will not repeat the mistakes made in the United States.”

The group is referring to 17 U.S.C. Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,(the "DMCA"), which purports to make it unlawful to override a CD or DVD's digital copyright protection even if the copying of the copyrighted material is legitimate, non-infringing fair use.

Nevertheless, I'm not sure a court could impose liability under Section 1201 of the DMCA on someone who evades DRM protection on a CD or DVD if the copying is for a fair use. Fair use is founded in the Constitution, both in Article I, Section 7, which gives Congress the power to "promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," and in the First Amendment protection of free speech. In other words, fair use is a constitutional right, and constitutional rights cannot be derogated by legislation.

Not everyone agrees. Chris Soghoian writes that the creators of the Hillary's Inner Tracy Flick video are in violation of the DMCA's provision making it unlawful to copy material under DRM protection even if the video otherwise makes fair use of scenes from the movie Election. Soghoian cites to the statement by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Atari v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), that "[t]o invoke the fair use exception, an individual must possess an authorized copy of a literary work." Thus, Soghoian concludes, if the creator of the video "used DVD-ripping software, its unencrypted, DRM-free copy of the work (which they would have needed to cut and paste bits into their mash up) is in no way authorized. This means, unfortunately for [the video's creator], that it would have no fair-use defense, and could thus face a copyright infringement lawsuit."

I'm not so sure. Congress cannot through legislation deprive someone of using material in a way the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution permit. Thus, I am confident, a statute that makes it unlawful to copy for fair use purposes any document stating "no copy of this document is permitted by its author for any purposes" would be unenforceable under the Constitution. I do not see why DRM protection, which can generally be cracked very easily, should, for fair use purposes, be treated any differently than such a bare declaration that any copying is unlawful.

The Associated Press Overreaches

The Associated Press, in a blatant disregard of fair use, is purporting to require payment for the quotation on a website of as few as five words from AP articles. The starting price, for five words, is $62.50 (@ $12.50/word). Pursuant to this policy, the AP has issued 6 DMCA takedown notices against the Drudge Retort, "claiming that the users linking to its stories are violating its copyright and committing 'hot news' misappropriation under New York state law." Apparently, the firestorm of protest the AP's new policy provoked has led to some rethinking on AP's part, but, as Michael Arrington of TechCrunch.com, explains:

The A.P. doesn't get to make its own rules around how its content is used, if those rules are stricter than the law allows. So even thought they say they are making these new guidelines in the spirit of cooperation, it's clear that, like the RIAA and MPAA, they are trying to claw their way to a set of property rights that don't exist today and that they are not legally entitled to. And like the RIAA and MPAA, this is done to protect a dying business model - paid content.

According to Columbia law professor Timothy Wu, "'the principal question is whether the excerpt is a substitute for the story, or some established adaptation of the story.' . . . Mr. Wu said that the case is not clear-cut, but he believes that The A.P. is likely to lose a court case to assert a claim on that issue. 'It’s hard to see how the Drudge Retort "first few lines" is a substitute for the story,' Mr. Wu said. "

YouTomb

YouTomb is a research project by MIT Free Culture that tracks videos taken down from YouTube for alleged copyright violation. More specifically, YouTomb continually monitors the most popular videos on YouTube for copyright-related takedowns. Any information available in the metadata is retained, including who issued the complaint and how long the video was up before takedown. The goal of the project is to identify how YouTube recognizes potential copyright violations as well as to aggregate mistakes made by the algorithm. Who is behind YouTomb? YouTomb was built by MIT Free Culture, a student organization at MIT. Active Free Culture chapters exist at many schools and universities; they work together to promote open access to knowledge and culture.

What's recently been taken down?
John Lennon's #9 Dream, which had originally been posted on September 2, 2006, and was taken down today.

Gee, do you think today's move has anything to do with pique over the decision rejecting Yoko Ono's motion for a preliminary injunction and allowing Expelled to be distributed with the 15 seconds of "Imagine" remaining?

Andrew McLaughlin on Copyright v. Fair Use and Google’s Latest Response

Andrew McLaughlin on Copyright v. Fair Use and Google’s Latest Response

From the Electronic Frontier Foundantion:

In OPG v. Diebold, [337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004)(pdf)] a California district court has determined that Diebold, Inc., a manufacturer of electronic voting machines, knowingly misrepresented that online commentators, including IndyMedia and two Swarthmore college students, had infringed the company's copyrights. EFF and the Center for Internet and Society Cyberlaw Clinic at Stanford Law School sued on behalf of nonprofit Internet Service Provider (ISP) Online Policy Group (OPG) and the two students to prevent Diebold's abusive copyright claims from silencing public debate about voting.

Diebold sent dozens of cease-and-desist letters to ISPs hosting leaked internal documents revealing flaws in Diebold's e-voting machines. The company claimed copyright violations and used the DMCA to demand that the documents be taken down. One ISP, OPG, refused to remove them in the name of free speech, and thus became the first ISP to test whether it would be held liable for the actions of its users in such a situation.

In his decision, Judge Jeremy Fogel wrote, "No reasonable copyright holder could have believed that the portions of the email archive discussing possible technical problems with Diebold's voting machines were proteced by copyright." In turn, Diebold had violated section 512(f) of the DMCA, which makes it unlawful to use DMCA takedown threats when the copyright holder knows that infringement has not actually occured.

Diebold subsequently agreed to pay $125,000 in damages and fees.

EFF's page providing all the legal documents in OPG v. Diebold is here.

Google's policy on DMCA takedown notices is set forth here.

Viacom terrorizes YouTube with DMCA Notices

From Cory Doctorow at BoingBoing on February 3, 2007:

Viacom did a general search on YouTube for any term related to any of its shows, and then spammed YouTube with 100,000 DMCA take-down notices alleging that all of these clips infringed its copyright and demanding that they be censored off the Internet. YouTube made thousands of clips vanish, and sent warning notices to the people who'd posted them, warning them that they were now on a list of potential copyright infringers and telling them that repeat offenses could lead to having their accounts terminated.

This is shockingly bad behaviour on the part of both Viacom and Google, YouTube's owner. Viacom's indiscriminate spamigation is incredibly negligent and evil. They certainly know that a search for a term like "Redbones" will catch videos like Jim Moore's Sunday nite dinner at Redbones in Somerville, Mass (a 30 second clip of Moore and several friends "having dinner in a ribs place in Somerville"). The idea that they have members of the bar -- officers of the court! -- signing affidavits swearing that they have a good-faith belief that these clips infringe their copyrights is disgraceful. Practicing law is a privilege, not a right. The law societies should be holding these attorneys to account for this kind of behaviour.

But Google's lawyers should have known better, too. The DMCA says that if a web-hoster ignores a takedown request, it's liable for copyright damages if the material in question is found to be infringing. YouTube can't afford to just let any lunatic -- including the savage pricks at Viacom -- indiscriminately censor the content it hosts. That's not fair to its customers.

DMCA Takedown Notices

From Chilling Effects:

Question: Does a DMCA takedown mean the material taken down was infringing?

Answer: No. ISPs can take down material according to the DMCA anytime they receive a compliant notice alleging copyright infringement (see What are the notice and takedown procedures for we...?). The ISP does not have to investigate to determine whether the material was truly infringing before taking it down. The fact that someone has claimed infringement does not prove that infringement occurred -- there might be a fair use defense, or the claim might have been false or even frivolous.

In order to ensure that copyright owners do not wrongly insist on the removal of materials that actually do not infringe their copyrights, the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA require service providers to notify the subscribers if their materials have been removed and to provide them with an opportunity to send a written notice to the service provider stating that the material has been wrongly removed. [512(g)] If a subscriber provides a proper "counter-notice" claiming that the material does not infringe copyrights, the service provider must then promptly notify the claiming party of the individual's objection. [512(g)(2)] If the copyright owner does not bring a lawsuit in district court within 14 days, the service provider is then required to restore the material to its location on its network. [512(g)(2)(C)]

A proper counter-notice must contain the following information:

The subscriber's name, address, phone number and physical or electronic signature [512(g)(3)(A)]

Identification of the material and its location before removal [512(g)(3)(B)]

A statement under penalty of perjury that the material was removed by mistake or misidentification [512(g)(3)(C)]

Subscriber consent to local federal court jurisdiction, or if overseas, to an appropriate judicial body. [512(g)(3)(D)]

If it is determined that the copyright holder misrepresented its claim regarding the infringing material, the copyright holder then becomes liable to the OSP for any damages that resulted from the improper removal of the material. [512(f)]